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Abstract 
 
This paper explores common trends in inequality and redistribution 
across OECD countries from the late 1980s to 2013. Low-end ine-
quality rises during economic downturns while rising top-end ine-
quality is associated with economic growth. Most countries retreated 
from redistribution from the mid-1990s until the onset of the Great 
Recession and compensatory redistribution in response to rising un-
employment was weaker in 2008-13 than in the first half of the 
1990s.  As unemployment and poverty risk became increasingly con-
centrated among workers with low education, middle-income opinion 
has become more permissive of cuts in unemployment insurance gen-
erosity and income assistance to the poor. At constant generosity, the 
expansion of more precarious forms of employment reduces compen-
satory redistribution during downturns because temporary employ-
ees do not have the same access to unemployment benefits as perma-
nent employees. 
Keywords: comparative political economy; income inequality; redistribution; 
unemployment; poverty risk 
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the European University Institute 
(July 1, 2016) and at Sciences Po Paris (October 19, 2016).  For detailed com-
ments and constructive suggestions, we are grateful to Silja Häusermann, Bruno 
Palier and John Stephens. 
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This paper seeks to provide a broad-gauged assessment of what has 
happened to income inequality and redistribution in OECD countries 
since the global financial and economic crisis of 2007-09 and to draw 
lessons from this experience for the literature on the political econo-
my of redistribution. Our empirical analysis concerns inequality and 
redistribution among working-age households. For eleven core 
OECD countries, we situate inequality trends and compensatory re-
distribution in the wake of the Great Recession against the backdrop 
of the preceding twenty years. With data drawn from a larger set of 
OECD countries, we also explore determinants of the extent to which 
income transfers compensate for increases in market inequality. 
Focusing on change over time rather than enduring cross-national 
differences, we want to draw attention to recessions as a source of 
inequality and to argue, more broadly, that the literature on the polit-
ical economy of redistribution ought to pay more attention to macro-
economic conditions. It is commonplace for scholars and pundits 
alike to posit that “market forces” have been a source of steadily ris-
ing income inequality for the last 20-30 years, with “institutions” 
resisting market-generated pressures to a greater extent in some 
countries than in others. Challenging conventional wisdom, our data 
show that relative poverty as well as overall inequality, measured 
before taxes and transfers, jumped in virtually all OECD countries in 
the early 1990s, held steady or even declined from 1994 to 2007, and 
then increased again in the wake of the Great Recession. 
We also show that the redistributive impact of taxes and transfers 
declined in most countries from the mid-1990s to the onset of the 
crisis. Tax-transfer systems compensated for inequality shocks in the 
first half of the 1990s and again after 2008, but compensatory redis-
tribution in 2008-13 was less extensive. Taking into account the ef-
fects of “inequality stabilizers” built into modern tax-transfer sys-
tems, the experience of 2008-13 represents a continuation of the re-
treat from redistribution that began in 1994-2007.  
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It is tempting to explain this retreat from redistribution in terms of a 
growing pro-rich bias in policy-making, but increases in top income 
shares are not correlated with reductions in redistribution across 
countries. Our discussion instead emphasizes support for redistribu-
tion among electorally pivotal middle-income citizens. While top-
income shares rose, relative poverty rates fell and poverty risk be-
came more concentrated among low-educated citizens in the 10-15 
years of economic growth that preceded the Great Recession. Mid-
dle-income citizens arguably became less worried about falling into 
poverty and also less sympathetic towards the poor. In any case, the 
available evidence suggests that they became less supportive of re-
distribution. While poverty rates rose in the wake of Great Reces-
sion, top income shares fell in most countries, at least initially, and 
the concentration of poverty risk became even more pronounced. 
In what follows, we begin by situating our analysis and arguments in 
relation to existing literature on the politics of inequality and redis-
tribution.  Moving on to empirics, section 2 provides an overview of 
changes in overall inequality and redistribution from the late 1980s 
until 2013 while section 3 shows that macroeconomic conditions 
have different implications for low-end and high-end inequality. Sec-
tion 4 explores the responsiveness of redistribution to changes in 
unemployment and the reasons why there was less compensatory 
redistribution in 2008-12 than in the early 1990s. Section 5 introduc-
es evidence pertaining to pro-rich bias and middle-income support 
for redistribution and section 6 offers some concluding remarks.   
 
1. Literature Review and Preliminary Discussion 
The topic of redistribution and, in particular, the question of how 
inequality and redistribution are related to each other has moved to 
the center stage of comparative political economy in recent years. 
One strand of research on this topic engages in macro-level cross-
national comparisons. Such analyses can be seen as an extension of 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 59 
5 
the tradition of comparative welfare-state research, with redistribu-
tion replacing social spending or welfare-state generosity as the out-
come to be explained and inequality featuring as one of the explana-
tory variables of theoretical interest (see Bradley et al. 2003, Huber 
and Stephens 2014, also Kenworthy and Pontusson 2005). To date, 
macro-comparative research has focused on explaining cross-
national variation rather than common trends among OECD coun-
tries.
1
 This is not to say that macro-comparativists are only interested 
in why some countries redistribute more than others. The point is 
rather that macro-comparativists approach the question of change 
over time with a particular question in mind: Why has inequality 
grown more in some countries than in others?   Related to this, the 
macro-comparative research tradition focuses on long-term structural 
changes—globalization, the growth of service employment, skill-
biased technological change, and changes in household composi-
tion—as the drivers of rising inequality. 
A second strand of comparative research focuses on individual pref-
erences for redistribution and explores the impact of inequality on 
individual preferences. This approach to the politics of redistribution 
often takes the Meltzer-Richard model (Meltzer and Richard 1981) 
as its point of departure. In the Meltzer-Richard model, the prefer-
ences of pivotal voters determine government policy and these vot-
ers, situated near the median of the income distribution, demand 
more redistribution as inequality rises or, more precisely, as income 
becomes more concentrated at the top. As commonly noted, the pre-
diction that inequality is positively associated with redistribution 
does not hold cross-nationally: quite the contrary, governments in 
countries with a more egalitarian distribution of market earnings tend 
to engage in more redistribution through taxes and transfers (Ken-
worthy and Pontusson 2005, Iversen and Soskice 2009). Focusing on 
                                                 
1
 This also holds for macro-comparative studies that treat varieties of capitalism and elec-
toral systems as the main source of cross-national variation (e.g., Estevez-Abe, Iversen and 
Soskice 2000, Iversen and Soskice 2006).   
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change over time, it is hard to identify any country in which rising 
top-end inequality has triggered more redistribution. 
The literature on individual preferences for redistribution seeks to 
resolve this puzzle by challenging the Meltzer-Richard assumption 
that voters are only or primarily motivated by maximization of their 
current income. Broadly speaking, this literature can be divided into 
two camps: studies that emphasize insurance motives or, in other 
words, prospects for downward or upward mobility in the income 
distribution (e.g., Iversen and Soskice 2001) and studies that invoke 
other-regarding motives, such as altruism (e.g., Dimick, Rueda and 
Stegmueller 2016) or affinity with the poor (e.g., Alesina and Glaeser 
2004). While the insurance school argues that democratic politics 
will tolerate rising inequality if and when it is associated with a de-
cline in economic insecurity among middle-income voters, the other-
regarding school suggests that democratic politics will tolerate rising 
inequality when it is associated with an increase in ethnic or racial 
minorities among the poor.   
The literature on preferences for redistribution has yielded many in-
teresting insights, but it might fairly be faulted, we think, for losing 
sight of redistribution as a macro-level outcome.  By now, we know 
a good deal about the factors that determine support for redistribution 
at the individual level, but we know surprisingly little about whether 
or how support for redistribution matters to political behavior.
2
 Even 
if it is the case that preferences for redistribution determine voting 
behavior, it is far from self-evident that the preferences of citizens, as 
expressed in elections, are the key to understanding cross-national 
and over-time variation in redistribution. Another striking feature of 
the preferences literature is the absence of any sustained effort to 
address the sources of rising inequality. Most contributors to this 
literature treat inequality as an exogenous variable to which citizens 
and parties respond (some more than others), but it is unclear, theo-
                                                 
2
 See Rueda and Stegmueller (2016) for a recent attempt to tackle this question. 
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retically and empirically, whether individuals respond to the distribu-
tion of income before or after taxes and transfers.   
While drawing on the preferences literature, we seek to bring redis-
tribution, understood as a macro-level outcome, back into the spot-
light. Relative to the macro-comparative literature to date, our analy-
sis emphasizes income dynamics related to macroeconomic cycles 
and, by extension, common trends across OECD countries.  Analyti-
cal insights might be gained, we believe, by focusing on how tax-
transfer systems respond to inequality shocks during economic 
downturns.  
Our core argument about the politics of redistribution builds on Lupu 
and Pontusson (2011), who posit that it is the structure of inequality 
rather than the level of inequality that matters to the formation of 
middle-income preferences and political coalitions. The Lupu-
Pontusson thesis boils down to this: if the distance from the middle 
to the bottom of the income distribution is smaller than the distance 
from the middle to the top, middle-income citizens will be inclined to 
join a pro-redistribution coalition with the poor, but if the distance to 
the bottom is bigger than the distance to the top, middle-income citi-
zens will be inclined to join an anti-redistribution with the affluent. 
As mobility prospects are a function of income distances, worries 
about downward mobility dominate in the former scenario while 
hopes of upward mobility dominate in the latter scenario, but social 
affinity may also motivate middle-income citizens to behave in the 
predicted fashion. (Lupu and Pontusson deliberately equivocate on 
the extent to which support for redistribution is self-interested or 
other-regarding). 
Lupu and Pontusson (2011) measure the structure of inequality by 
dividing the 90-50 (upper-to-middle) ratio by the 50-10 (middle-to-
lower) ratio. Relying on OECD data on earnings among full-time 
employees, they present regression results suggesting that the skew 
measured in this fashion is indeed associated with redistribution 
across countries and over time. However, 50-10 earnings ratios have 
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generally changed little while 90-50 ratios have increased in most 
OECD countries since the mid-1990s. By the logic of Lupu and Pon-
tusson, this should have translated into a general trend for redistribu-
tion, which is clearly not what we observe.  As a partial solution to 
this puzzle, we propose to measure low-end inequality by relative 
poverty rates (the percentage of the population living in households 
with incomes below 50% of the median income) rather than 50-10 
earnings ratios. Relative poverty is arguably a better measure of “in-
come distance,” telling us the number of income percentiles that sep-
arates the median income earner from the poor. Consistent with Lupu 
and Pontusson, our working hypothesis is that middle-income citi-
zens become less worried about falling into poverty and perhaps feel 
less affinity with the poor as the poverty rate falls.    
We go beyond Lupu and Pontusson (2011) not only by introducing 
new measures of low-end and high-end income inequality, but also 
by taking into account the distribution of unemployment and poverty 
risk in a more systematic fashion. The “structure of inequality”, as 
we conceive it in this paper, pertains the distribution of risk as well 
as the distribution of income. An extensive literature demonstrates 
that labor-market risks—unemployment risk in particular—have be-
come significantly more concentrated among low-skilled workers, 
immigrants and young people as a result of the expansion of non-
standard forms of unemployment over the last two or three decades 
(e.g., King and Rueda 2008, Emmenegger et al. 2012). Some of this 
literature argues that welfare states have also undergone “dualiza-
tion” in the sense that the welfare benefits provided to labor-market 
“outsiders” have deteriorated relative to the benefits provided to “in-
siders” (e.g., Palier and Thelen 2010, Seeleib-Kaiser, Saunders and 
Naczyk 2012).  Importantly for our purposes, the dualization litera-
ture dovetails with Lupu and Pontusson (2011) in the sense that it 
treats the (asymmetric) distribution of economic insecurity rather 
than the average level of insecurity as the critical variable shaping 
the politics of compensatory redistribution (see also Rehm, Hacker 
and Schlesinger 2012, and Alt and Iversen 2016). 
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Like most of the literature on preferences for redistribution, our ap-
proach posits that government policy is responsive to the preferences 
of middle-income citizens.  Several important studies of American 
politics (most notably Hacker and Pierson 2011 and Gilens 2014) 
question the extent to which this is so and income bias in political 
representation has recently become a topic of debate among compar-
ativists. It is tempting to suppose, as suggested by Rosset, Giger and 
Bernauer (2013), that pro-rich political bias rises with income ine-
quality. In due course, we shall briefly address this question. For the 
time being, suffice it to note that we do not wish to argue that mid-
dle-income preferences are the main, let alone the only, driver of 
policy changes that have rendered tax-transfer systems less respon-
sive to rising inequality. In our thinking, public opinion plays a more 
limited and indirect role, permitting (or not) policy changes initiated 
for other reasons.  
Our analysis of the political economy of compensatory redistribution 
situates government policy in a broader context. Our point of depar-
ture is the observation that “automatic equalizers” are built into mod-
ern tax-transfer systems. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that un-
employment insurance is financed by a proportional income tax and 
provides an income replacement that is strictly proportional to the 
income earned before becoming unemployed. Typically, firms are 
more likely to shed unskilled labor than skilled labor during econom-
ic downturns and adults in the lower half of the income distribution 
are less skilled than adults in the upper half of the income distribu-
tion.
3
 Under these conditions, rising unemployment during economic 
downturns increases inequality, particularly low-end inequality, be-
fore taxes and transfers. At the same time, redistribution increases 
because low-income households’ share of income taxes decreases 
while their share of unemployment benefits increases. By the same 
                                                 
3
 See Hudomiet (2014) for a useful review of labor economics literature on the incidence of 
unemployment by skill; and Brady and Jäntti (2016) for a review of the broader economics 
literature on macroeconomic performance, inequality and poverty.  
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mechanisms, redistribution tends to decline as the economy recovers 
and (cyclical) unemployment falls. 
Policy choices affect the extent to which redistribution responds to 
inequality generated by rising unemployment. The progressivity of 
taxation undoubtedly matters, but income transfers to the unem-
ployed (i.e., benefits) would appear to be the main policy source var-
iation in responsiveness across countries and over time. There are 
essentially two dimensions of policy choice with respect to income 
transfers: the replacement rate (or generosity level) and the coverage 
rate. Though the extent to which individuals in temporary and part-
time employment are covered by unemployment insurance or similar 
benefits varies, it is typically the case that they do not qualify for the 
same level of income replacement as individuals in permanent full-
time employment.   This, then, introduces another potential source of 
variation in the responsiveness of redistribution: holding generosity 
and eligibility conditions constant, compensatory redistribution will 
decline if unemployment becomes more concentrated to individuals 
with less than full access to unemployment compensation. 
 
2. Trends in inequality and redistribution  
Pooling data from the Luxembourg Income Study (LIS) and the Eu-
ropean Union’s Statistics on Income and Living Conditions (SILC) 
allows us to track the evolution of income inequality and redistribu-
tion in eleven OECD countries from the late 1980s until 2013. Like 
many other comparative studies of redistribution, we restrict our 
analysis to working-age households.
4
 Previous studies make this 
                                                 
4 The inequality and poverty figures presented here were calculated based on LIS 
(2016) and EU-SILC microdata.  Household income data have been adjusted using 
the square root of the number of household members as the equivalence scale, top-
coded at 10 times the median non-equivalized income and bottom-coded at 1 per-
cent of equivalized mean income. The aggregate indicators based on equivalized 
household income are restricted to household members aged between 18 and 64 
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move to sidestep the problem that retired households typically have 
very little “market income” in countries with generous public pen-
sions, producing inflated measures of redistribution. In our case, this 
choice is also motivated by our interest in the impact of macroeco-
nomic conditions, which is surely most direct and most pronounced 
for working-age households.
5
 
The measure of inequality used here is the Gini coefficient multiplied 
by 100, representing the percentage of total income that would have 
to be redistributed to achieve perfect equality across all households. 
In Table 1, we report changes in the Gini coefficient for household 
income before taxes and income transfers (“pre-fisc inequality”) as 
well as household income after taxes and transfers (“post-fisc ine-
quality”).6 Our measure of redistribution is the reduction in the Gini 
coefficient produced by taxes and transfers by the government or, in 
other words, the difference between the pre-fisc Gini coefficient and 
the post-fisc Gini coefficient. Following Kenworthy and Pontusson 
(2005), we measure redistribution as the absolute reduction in the 
Gini coefficient produced by taxes and transfers, but the basic pat-
                                                                                                                 
using adult weights. Our LIS-based estimates of Gini coefficients correspond very 
closely to the Gini coefficients recorded in the “Comparative Welfare States Data 
Set” (forthcoming version, calculated in July 2016): for pre-fisc Gini coefficients, 
the correlation is .989 (p=.000, N=105) and for post-fisc Gini coefficients, the 
correlation is .995 (p=.000, N=134). For 32 overlapping country-years, the correla-
tion between our LIS-based and SILC-based estimates of pre-fisc Gini coefficients 
is .94 (p=.000) while the correlation between LIS-based and SILC-based estimates of post-
fisc Gini coefficients is .95 (p=.000).   
5
 See Jenkins et al. (2013) and OECD (2015:ch.3) on the immediate impact of the 
Great Recession on post-fisc inequality among all households; and OECD (2011) 
on trends in income inequality among all households over the twenty years preced-
ing the Great Recession. OECD (2015:ch.3) emphasizes that poverty rates for the 
elderly have been much less affected by the Great Recession than poverty rates for 
the working-age population. 
6
 In the terminology of LIS, the former measure pertains to “market income” and 
the latter to “disposable income.”  We use the terms “pre-fisc” and “post-fisc” for 
convenience, but also to signal that income before taxes and transfers is not simply 
a “market phenomenon.” 
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terns in the data are the same for redistribution measured in percent 
of the pre-fisc Gini coefficient.  For the two inequality measures and 
the redistribution measure alike, Table 1 reports change measured as 
the (absolute) difference between the earlier and the more recent ob-
servation. In other words, we report percentage-point changes rather 
than percentage changes in inequality. 
To focus attention on the effects of the macroeconomic conditions, 
Table 1 records changes in inequality and redistribution over three 
time periods: from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, from the mid-
1990s to the onset of the Great Recession and from 2008 to the most 
recent observation available (in most cases, 2013). Generalizing 
across the OECD area, sharp economic downturns, followed by slug-
gish growth and persistently high unemployment, characterize the 
first and the third period. By comparison to the early 1990s as well as 
2007-08, the international recession of 2001-02 was a minor down-
turn and sustained economic growth characterizes the second period 
as a whole.
7
 
For heuristic purposes, Table 1 sorts OECD countries into three con-
ventional groups, based on a combination of geography, language 
and welfare-state regimes.  In the last column of Table 1, we report 
the most recent observation of post-fisc inequality, with rankings in 
parentheses. Consistent with conventional wisdom, the Nordic coun-
tries tend to be more equal than continental European countries and 
continental European tend to be more than Anglophone countries 
                                                 
7
 While LIS is the source of all our data for the first and second periods, our data 
for the third period come from LIS in three instances (Australia, Canada and the 
US), otherwise from SILC.  SILC data is available on an annual basis and ends in 
2013 for all countries but Switzerland (2012).  As indicated in the first panel of 
Table 1, the exact time periods to which the LIS data refer vary by country.  This 
problem might be addressed by calculating average annual changes, but our goal 
here is not to compare rates of change across countries.   The raw numbers in Table 
1 strike us as more informative: for instance, they allow us to see that increases in 
pre-fisc inequality in the early 1990s were never offset by decreases during the 
growth period that followed. 
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(but in 2013, the Netherlands is more equal than Denmark and Aus-
tralia is more equal than Germany). More importantly for our pur-
poses, Table 1 brings out common trends that cut across the country 
groups and shows that these common trends follow the macroeco-
nomic cycle. 
The role of macroeconomic conditions is most immediately apparent 
in the data on pre-fisc inequality. While pre-fisc inequality declined 
in the Netherlands from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, it increased 
substantially in the other ten countries and especially in the Nordic 
countries. Across the eleven countries, the Gini coefficient for pre-
fisc income of working-age households increased by an average of 
3.7 percentage points. Over the growth period from 1994 to 2007, 
pre-fisc inequality continued to rise in Norway, Germany and Cana-
da, but held steady in the US and fell in the other seven countries. 
Averaging across the eleven countries, the Gini coefficient for pre-
fisc income among working-age households declined by 0.1 from the 
mid-1990s to 2007.
8
 
                                                 
8
 It is important to keep in mind that the second period is longer than the first.  In 
countries that continued to experience growing inequality, the growth of inequality 
slowed down in the second period. On average, the German net-income Gini coef-
ficient increased by .62 per year from 1989 to 1994 and by .33 per year from 1994 
to 2007. 
 
LIEPP Working Paper n° 59 
 
14 
 
Table 1: Changes in pre-fisc income Ginis, post-fisc income Ginis and redistribution 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: The table records absolute changes in pre-fisc Gini coefficients, post-fisc Gini coefficients and redistribution among working-age households, with redistribution 
measured as the absolute difference between the pre-fisc and post-fisc Gini coefficients. Detailed time periods indicated in brackets after the country names. Sources: 
LIS (early 1990s, 1994-2007 and recent period for Australia, Canada and the US) and EU-SILC (2008-13) microdata. 
 early 1990s ca. 1994-2007  ca. 2008-13 2013 
 
pre-fisc post-fisc redistr pre-fisc post-fisc redistr pre-fisc post-fisc redistr post-fisc Gini 
Nordic: 
          
Denmark (87-95, 95-07, 08-13) 
+2.8 -2.9 +5.7 -0.6 +2.3 -2.9 +3.7 +2.8 +0.9 27.7  (5) 
Finland (87-95, 95-07, 08-13) 
+8.8 +1.8 +7.0 -2.4 +4.2 -6.6 +1.2 0.0 +1.2 26.0  (3) 
Norway (86-95, 95-07, 08-13) 
+5.8 +1.4 +4.4 +3.5 +1.5 +2.0 -0.8 -0.5 -0.3    24.6  (1) 
Sweden (87-95, 95-05, 08-13) 
+7.5 +2.7 +4.8 -3.2 -0.7 -2.5 +0.7 +1.1 -0.4 25.4  (2) 
Continental:           
France (89-94, 94-05, 08-13) 
+0.6 +0.7 -0.1 -2.0 -1.7 -0.3 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 29.1  (6) 
Germany (89-94, 94-07, 08-13) 
+3.1 +1.8 +1.3 +4.3 +2.4 +1.9 0.0 +1.5 -1.5 31.6  (8) 
Netherlands (87-93, 93-07, 08-13) 
-1.2 +1.5 -2.7 -1.0 +1.8 -2.8 +0.7 -0.3 +1.0 27.0  (4) 
Anglo:           
Australia (89-95, 95-08, 08-10) 
+3.7 +1.2 +2.5 -0.6 +2.2 -2.8 -0.2 -0.8 +0.6 31.3  (7) 
Canada (87-94, 94-07, 07-10) 
+3.4 +0.5 +2.9 +2.5 +3.4 -0.9 +0.7 +0.4 +0.3 32.2  (9) 
UK (86-94, 94-07, 08-13) 
+3.5 +3.5 0.0 -1.3 +0.4 -1.7 +0.3 +1.3 -1.0 32.5  (10) 
USA (86-94, 94-07, 07-13) 
+2.5 +2.2 +0.3 0.0 +1.1 -1.1 +2.8 +1.2 +1.6 37.4  (11) 
           
average +3.7 +1.3 +2.4 -0.1 +1.5 -1.6 +0.8 +0.6 +0.2 29.5 
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Over the period from 2008 to 2013, pre-fisc inequality increased in 
seven out of eleven countries. The Gini coefficient for pre-fisc in-
come was unchanged in Germany and declined marginally in Nor-
way, France and Australia. While Denmark and the US experienced 
inequality shocks comparable to the early 1990s, the inegalitarian 
impact of the Great Recession in core OECD countries was, general-
ly speaking, much less dramatic than the impact of the recession of 
the early 1990s.
9
 Averaging across the eleven countries included in 
Table 1, the pre-fisc Gini increased by less than one percentage 
point. As noted by Jenkins et al. (2013:55), the limited impact of the 
Great Recession on the distribution of income is closely related to the 
fact that unemployment in core OECD countries rose less sharply 
than in the recessions of the 1970s, 1980s and 1990s. Across the 
eleven countries included in Table 1, the (harmonized) rate of unem-
ployment rose by an average of 1.5 percentage points from 2008 to 
2012, as compared to an average increase of 3.3 percentage points 
from 1990 to 1994 (OECD Statistics). 
The cyclical pattern that we observe for pre-fisc inequality is less 
evident in the data on post-fisc inequality presented in Table 1. By 
definition, the difference between inequality measures based on these 
two income concepts is a function of the redistributive effects of tax-
es and income transfers between households. The data presented in 
Table 1 supports two broad observations about redistribution and the 
evolution of post-fisc inequality. The first observation concerns the 
growth period of 1994-2007. As noted above, pre-fisc inequality fell 
in seven of the eleven countries over this period. However, post-fisc 
inequality rose in five of these countries (Denmark, Finland, the 
                                                 
9
 The story is entirely different for Ireland and Southern Europe.  From 2008 to 
2013, the Gini coefficient for pre-fisc income of working-age households increased 
by 2.0 percentage points in Italy, 3.8 in Ireland, 3.9 in Portugal, 5.2 in Greece and 
6.5 in Spain according to our SILC-based estimates. We shall return to the experi-
ence of these countries in the concluding discussion. 
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Netherlands, Australia and the UK) and it fell less than pre-fisc ine-
quality in the other two countries (Sweden and France). In the US, 
post-fisc inequality rose while pre-fisc inequality was unchanged and 
in Canada post-fisc inequality rose more sharply than pre-fisc ine-
quality. In the words of the OECD (2011:18), ‘‘from the mid-1990s 
to 2005, the reduced redistributive capacity of tax-benefit systems 
was sometimes the main source of widening household-income 
gaps.’’ 
The second observation concerns the extent of compensatory redis-
tribution during economic downturns. In nine of the ten countries in 
which pre-fisc inequality rose from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, 
post-fisc inequality rose less or, in the Danish case, actually declined. 
Averaging across these ten countries, the Gini coefficient for pre-fisc 
income rose by 4.2 while the Gini coefficient for post-fisc income 
only increased by 1.3.  In other words, changes in the incidence of 
taxation and income transfers offset roughly 69% of the increase in 
pre-fisc inequality. In the 2008-2013 period, taxes and transfers again 
compensated for rising pre-fisc inequality, but not to the same extent. 
On average, the Gini coefficient for pre-fisc income increased by 1.4 
while the Gini coefficient for post-fisc income increased by 0.9 in the 
seven countries that experienced a rise in pre-fisc inequality from 
2008 to 2013, i.e., taxes and transfers offset only 36% of the increase 
in pre-fisc inequality (and only 25% across all eleven countries). 
What distinguishes the experience of the Great Recession from that 
of the early 1990s are not only smaller inequality shocks, but also 
less compensatory redistribution.
10
 
It deserves to be noted that much of the retreat from redistribution 
over the period 1994-2007 occurred after 2000.  In all but two coun-
tries (Denmark and Finland), the decline in redistribution from 2000 
                                                 
10
 Note that the third period in Table 1 encompasses the fiscal stimulus phase of 
2008-09 as well as the early stages of the fiscal consolidation undertaken by most 
OECD countries from 2010. As suggested by OECD (2015:ch.3), the retreat from 
compensatory redistribution would probably be more apparent if the analysis were 
restricted to 2010-13. 
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to 2007 was greater than the decline in redistribution from 1994 to 
2000. The reversal of automatic equalizers accounts for only a part of 
the retreat from redistribution that began in the mid-1990s. 
Figure 1: Changes in post-fisc inequality plotted against changes in 
pre-fisc inequality
Source: LIS microdata. Dashed line: 45-degree line (equal changes in pre-fisc and post-fisc inequality). 
Solid line: linear prediction. 
For the eleven countries included in Table 1, Figure 1 shows the rela-
tionship between changes in pre-fisc and post-fisc inequality for each 
of the three time periods. The 45-degree lines in these scatterplots 
represent a hypothetical scenario in which there is no change in re-
distribution and, as a result, changes in post-fisc inequality corre-
spond perfectly to changes in pre-fisc inequality. In the first period, 
most observations fall below the 45-degree line, meaning that in-
creases in redistribution offset at least some of the increase in pre-
fisc inequality. In the second period, quite a few observations fall 
above the 45-degree line, meaning that changes in redistribution 
were regressive. Changes in pre-fisc inequality provide surprisingly 
little leverage on changes in post-fisc inequality across countries in 
either of these periods. By contrast, they are a strong and consistent 
AU
CA
DK
FI
FR
DENL NO
SEUS
GB
-5
0
5
10
-5 0 5 10
r=0.24 (p=0.48, N=11)
early 1990s
AU
CA
DK
FI
FR
DE
NL NO
SE
US
GB
-5
0
5
10
-5 0 5 10
r=0.38 (p=0.25, N=11)
ca. 1994-2007
AU
CA
DK
FI
FR
DE
NL
NO
SE
US
GB
-5
0
5
10
-5 0 5 10
r=0.70 (p=0.02, N=11)
ca. 2008-13
c
h
a
n
g
e
 i
n
 p
o
s
t-
fi
s
c
 i
n
c
o
m
e
 G
in
i
change in pre-fisc income Gini
LIEPP Working Paper n° 59 
18 
predictor of changes in post-fisc inequality in the third period (with 
most countries below the 45-degree line, as in the early 1990s). Gen-
erally speaking, tax-transfer systems appear to have become more 
market-conforming.  
 
3.  The structure of inequality 
We now turn to the question of how macroeconomic conditions af-
fect relative incomes at the bottom and the top of the income distri-
bution or, in other words, how they affect the structure of inequality. 
With the same periodization as Table 1, Table 2 reports on changes 
in relative poverty rates and top 1% income shares. Based on LIS and 
SILC data, the poverty rate is here defined as the percentage of work-
ing-age households that have a pre-fisc income below 50% of the 
median pre-fisc income of working-age households. Taken from the 
World Wealth and Income Database, the top 1% income share is the 
percentage total tax-declared income (including transfers) of “physi-
cal persons” that is declared by the top 1% of households or individ-
uals. As noted in the last column of Table 2, the top-income share 
data end before 2012-13 for some countries and thus capture only the 
initial phase of the crisis. 
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Table 2: Changes in pre-transfer income poverty rates and top 1% income shares 
 
Note: Pre-fisc poverty rates defined as percentage of working-age population living in working households with pre-fisc income below 50% of median pre-fisc household 
income.  The poverty data refer to country-specific time periods, as in Table 1. For Germany, top 1% income shares include capital gains, for other countries they do not.  
Periodization: 1989 to 1994, 1994 to 2007 and 2007 to most recent observation, with most recent observations noted in the last column. 
Sources: LIS and EU-SILC microdata for poverty rates and World Wealth and Income Database (http://www.wid.world, accessed June 8, 2016) for top income shares. 
 pre-fisc poverty rates top 1% income shares 
 early 
1990s ca. 1994-2007 
ca. 
2008-13 
most recent 
(2013) 1989-1994 1994-2007 2007- most recent 
Nordic:          
Denmark +2.1 -1.8 +2.2 26.2 -0.2 +1.1 +0.3 6.4 (2010) 
Finland +7.5 -3.8 +1.5 24.5 -0.2 +2.6 -0.8 7.5 (2009) 
Norway +6.5 +2.1 -1.1 20.2 +3.3 +1.1 -0.7 7.8 (2011) 
Sweden +6.7 -4.8 +1.7 21.3 +1.1 +1.4 +0.3 7.2 (2013) 
Continental:          
France +0.5 -0.7 +0.5 23.5 -0.5 +1.4 -0.2 8.9 (2012) 
Germany +3.8 +3.5 -0.7 25.3 -2.3 +4.9 -0.9 13.1 (2010) 
Netherlands +2.0 -3.2 +1.4 24.4 -0.4 +2.2 -1.2 6.3 (2012) 
Anglo:          
Australia +3.5 -2.1 +1.2 23.7 +0.7 +2.7 -0.7 9.2 (2010) 
Canada +4.1 0.0 +1.2 25.5 -0.2 +4.1 -1.5 12.2 (2010) 
UK +2.3 -1.4 +0.4 26.2 +0.8 +4.8 -2.7 12.7 (2012) 
USA +0.9 -0.3 +2.5 26.1 +0.2 +5.5 -0.8 17.5 (2013) 
          
average +3.6 -1.1 +1.0 24.3 +0.2 +2.9 -0.8 9.9  
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Pre-fisc poverty rates follow the macroeconomic cycle in much the 
same way as pre-fisc Gini coefficients.
11
 From the late 1980s to the 
mid-1990s, relative poverty increased in all eleven countries for 
which we have data on pre-fisc income (including the Netherlands, 
where the pre-fisc Gini coefficient fell in this period). While the ine-
quality shocks experienced by the Nordic countries in this period 
again stand out, the poverty rate rose by at least two percentage 
points in nine countries. By contrast, Norway and Germany stand out 
as the only two countries in which the pre-fisc poverty rate rose from 
the mid-1990s to the onset of the Great Recession. Norway and 
Germany are also the only countries in which the pre-fisc poverty 
rate did not rise in the wake of the Great Recession. As with pre-fisc 
Gini coefficients, poverty increases in the recent crisis were typically 
less sharp than poverty increases during the crisis of the early 1990s 
(with the notable exception of the US). 
The pattern in the data for top 1% income shares is strikingly differ-
ent. From 1989 to 1994, top income shares rose in half the countries 
and fell in the other half. In the ensuing period of relatively robust 
economic growth, rising top income shares became an OECD-wide 
phenomenon. On average, top income shares rose by nearly 3 per-
centage points from 1994 to 2007. Finally, top income shares fell in 
all but two countries (Denmark and Sweden) in the immediate after-
math of the financial crisis of 2007-08.  
The observation that low-skilled workers are particularly affected by 
cyclical unemployment provides a straightforward and compelling 
explanation of why it is that low-end inequality tends to rise during 
economic downturns and decline during upturns. Table 3 presents the 
                                                 
11
 The correlation coefficients for changes in pre-fisc Gini coefficients and changes 
in pre-fisc poverty rates are .90 (N=87, p=.000) based on LIS estimates and .61 
(N=140, p=.000) based on SILC estimates. For the levels of both variables, the 
correlation coefficients are .89 (N=106, p=.000, LIS-based) and .82 (N=156, 
p=.000, SILC-based). 
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results of estimating a series of simple OLS models that explore the 
effects of changes in unemployment on changes in pre-fisc Gini co-
efficients and poverty rates. The results presented here are based on 
pooling LIS data over the period 1990-2013, with SILC observations 
for recent years added for eight countries in addition to the eleven 
countries for which we have data over the entire period 1990-2013.
12
 
Along with fixed effects for countries and LIS waves, our models 
include the level of inequality in the previous LIS wave as an inde-
pendent variable.   
Table 3: Pre-fisc inequality and changes in unemployment, 1983-
2013 
 ∆ pre-fisc income Gini ∆ pre-fisc poverty rate 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Pre-fisc Gini level t-1 -0.512*** -0.518***   
 (0.087) (0.095)   
Pre-fisc poverty level t-1   -0.556*** -0.561*** 
   (0.097) (0.102) 
∆ Unemployment rate t 0.392***  0.353***  
 (0.058)  (0.055)  
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.439***  0.389** 
      * period 1990-95  (0.105)  (0.138) 
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.311*  0.284* 
   * period 1996-2007  (0.150)  (0.154) 
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.435***  0.391*** 
   * period 2008-13  (0.118)  (0.072) 
     
Number of observations 103 103 103 103 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 
R2 (within) 0.66 0.66 0.67 0.67 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-sided tests). Fixed-effects (within) regressions with 
cluster-robust (country clusters) Huber/White standard errors in parentheses and period dummies (LIS 
survey waves). Unemployment rates are averages between two income survey observations; change in 
unemployment measured as first difference of average unemployment rates (source: Armingeon et al. 
2015). Number of observations by time period: N=21 (1990-95), N=46 (1996-2007), and N=36 (2008-
13). 
                                                 
12
 The eight additional countries are Austria, Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Por-
tugal, Spain and Switzerland.  SILC data were added for 2004, 2007, 2010 and 
2013 when no LIS data was available for these years, thus matching SILC observa-
tions with LIS survey waves. We obtain very similar results when we restrict the 
analysis to the eleven countries listed in Table 1 (available upon request). 
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In all four models, the coefficient for the lagged level variable is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that pre-fisc inequali-
ty and relative poverty have grown more rapidly in more egalitarian 
countries. More importantly for our present purposes, the results con-
firm that change in the rate of unemployment is a powerful predictor 
of change in relative poverty as well as overall inequality. Contrary 
to what some of the dualization literature would seem to imply, the 
effect of changes in unemployment does not appear to have changed 
over time. Interacting changes in unemployment with period dum-
mies, we find that the inegalitarian impact of rising unemployment 
was more or less of the same magnitude in 2008-13 as in 1990-95 
(difference not statistically significant).     
 
4.  Income transfers to the unemployed 
Building on the analytical framework sketched at the end of the liter-
ature review, this section explores, briefly and tentatively, how redis-
tribution responds to changes in unemployment and how the generos-
ity of unemployment insurance benefits and the incidence of unem-
ployment affect redistribution responsiveness.
13
 For this purpose, it 
makes sense to set taxes aside and to focus on redistribution through 
transfer payments, measured as the difference between the Gini coef-
ficient for net income before transfers (i.e., post-tax, pre-transfer in-
come) and the Gini coefficient for disposable income or, in the ter-
minology adopted above, post-fisc income.
14
   
                                                 
13
 The following analysis is inspired by and seeks to improve on Rueda (2014, 
2015). 
14
 Based on LIS data, transfer payments account for the lion’s share of overall 
redistribution in most OECD countries (see Pontusson 2005, Table 7.4). For the 
nineteen countries included in our analysis, over the period 1990-2013, the correla-
tion between LIS-based changes in transfer redistribution and changes in total 
redistribution is .95 (N=112, p=.000). 
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To measure the generosity of unemployment insurance, we rely on 
the aggregate index developed by Lyle Scruggs. Summing net re-
placement rates of unemployment benefits for someone with a wage 
corresponding to that of the average production worker, with and 
without dependents, this index also takes into account the coverage 
of unemployment insurance and the duration of income replacement 
(Scruggs 2014). Table 4 presents descriptive data for our eleven core 
countries. In the first half of the 1990s and again in 1995-2008, some 
countries decreased unemployment insurance generosity while others 
increased it, but the balance appears to have shifted towards cutbacks 
in the second period, and we observe a pretty consistent pattern of 
retrenchment during the Great Recession (see also Pontusson and 
Raess 2012).
15
 The substantial cuts in generosity implemented in 
Denmark, Sweden, Finland and Germany between 1995 and 2008 are 
noteworthy, as is the contrast between Nordic responses to rising 
unemployment in the early 1990s and in the Great Recession.  In the 
early 1990s, Sweden maintained generosity while Denmark, Finland 
and Norway substantially increased generosity. In the Great Reces-
sion, Norway and Sweden both cut generosity while Denmark and 
Finland marginally increased generosity (against the backdrop of big 
cuts in the preceding period). 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 With Rueda’s (2014, 2015) measure of unemployment generosity (public spend-
ing on passive labor market programs in percent of GDP divided by the rate of 
unemployment), we observe a clear OECD-wide tendency for generosity to de-
cline, but using this measure in our regression models produces results that are 
very similar to the ones we report in Table 6. For our purposes, the Scruggs meas-
ure is preferable, since it does not involve the rate of unemployment (which fea-
tures on the right-hand side of the regression equation). 
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Table 4: The Scruggs index of unemployment insurance generosity 
Source: Comparative Welfare Entitlements Dataset (http://cwed2.org, accessed May 25, 2016). 
We seek to capture changes in the composition of unemployment by 
the ratio of the unemployment rate among working-age adults with 
less than secondary education to the unemployment rate for all work-
ing-age adults. On the assumption that workers with low education 
are more likely to have less permanent jobs and therefore less access 
to full unemployment insurance benefits, we hypothesize that this 
variable will be associated with less redistribution through income 
transfers to the unemployed. As indicated in Table 5, we do not have 
many observations of the concentration of unemployment among 
workers with less than secondary education for the first half of the 
1990s. Over the growth period 1995-2007, unemployment became 
more concentrated in all of our eleven core countries except Den-
mark, often significantly, and concentration again increased in eight 
out eleven countries from 2007 to 2013. 
 
 change 1990-95 change 1995-2008 change 2008-11 2011 
Nordic:     
Denmark +1.8 -3.8 +0.2 9.5 
Finland +1.4 -1.6 +0.6 9.4 
Norway +0.9 +0.2 -0.3 13.9 
Sweden 0.0 -3.6 -0.5 8.1 
Continental:     
France -2.0 +0.9 -0.2 11.1 
Germany -0.3 -1.1 -0.3 10.0 
Netherlands -0.9 +1.1 -0.1 11.7 
Anglo:     
Australia  +0.1 -0.5 0.0 7.2 
Canada -0.8 -0.2 -0.1 8.0 
UK -0.1 +0.5 -0.4 8.3 
USA +0.1 +0.1 +0.4 10.6 
     
average +0.0 -0.7 -0.1 9.8 
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Table 5: The ratio of the unemployment rate for low-educated to the 
national unemployment rate 
 
Note: Indicator refers to the unemployment rate for ISCED 2011 levels 0-2 (less than secondary educa-
tion completed) divided by the unemployment rate for all ISCED 2011 levels, workers aged 25 to 64.  
Sources: Eurostat (http://appsso.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/nui/show.do?dataset=lfsa_urgaed&lang=en, 
accessed October 27, 2016); data for Australia, Canada and USA from OECD Education at a glance 
(http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/889e8641-en, accessed October 26, 2016). 
 
Table 6 presents regression results, with change in redistribution 
through transfers as the dependent variable. Like the analyses pre-
sented in Table 3, the first five models are estimated by pooling LIS 
data for nineteen countries over the period 1990-2013, with some 
SILC observations for recent years added.
16
 Not including Australia, 
Canada and the US, the sixth model is estimated with annual SILC 
data for sixteen countries over the period 2004-13. As in Table 3, all 
models include the lagged independent variable as country and LIS-
                                                 
16
 The total number of observations is higher than in Table 3 because LIS allows us 
to calculate Gini coefficients for net income for more country-years than Gini 
coefficients for pre-fisc income. 
  earliest (year) change 1992-95 change 1995-2007 change 2007-13 
Nordic:     
Denmark 1.19 (1992) +0.44 -0.29 +0.17 
Finland 1.23 (1995)  +0.39 +0.20 
Norway 1.33 (1996)  +0.61 +0.14 
Sweden 1.34 (1995)   +0.26 +0.67 
Continental:     
France 1.35 (1993) +0.01 +0.14 +0.15 
Germany 1.55 (1992) +0.15 +0.47 +0.29 
Netherlands 1.45 (1996)  +0.03 -0.03 
Anglo:     
Australia  1.41 (1997)  +0.14 +0.07 
Canada 1.78 (2000)   +0.09 -0.02 
UK 1.26 (1992) +0.02 +0.34 +0.31 
USA 1.25 (1997)   +0.11 -0.08 
     
average 1.37 +0.16 +0.21 +0.17 
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wave fixed effects (or, in Model 6, year fixed effects). We again find 
strong evidence of cross-national convergence: countries that redis-
tribute more through income transfers seem to have been in the fore-
front of the retreat from compensatory redistribution.    
Table 6: Determinants of transfer redistribution changes, 1983-2013 
(LIS data) 
 LIS+SILC data 1990-2013 SILC 
2004-11 
∆ Transfer redistribution t (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Transfer redistribution -0.533*** -0.522*** -0.595*** -0.578*** -0.537*** -0.346** 
   level t-1 (0.087) (0.093) (0.081) (0.083) (0.085) (0.131) 
∆ Unemployment rate t 0.401***  0.348*** 0.357***  0.269** 
 (0.093)  (0.083) (0.075)  (0.106) 
UI generosity t   0.665** 0.522** 0.423** 0.359** 
   (0.247) (0.222) (0.183) (0.150) 
Concentration of    -1.382 -1.578 -2.004** 
   unemployment t    (1.104) (0.999) (0.738) 
       
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.567***   0.573***  
   * period 1990-95  (0.130)   (0.090)  
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.293   0.363**  
   * period 1996-2007  (0.177)   (0.171)  
∆ Unemployment rate t  0.347***   0.248***  
   * period 2008-13  (0.056)   (0.067)  
       
Number of observations 127 127 127 110 110 108 
Number of countries 19 19 19 19 19 16 
R2 (within) 0.66 0.67 0.72 0.76 0.78 0.48 
Note: * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 (two-sided tests). Fixed-effects (within) regressions with 
cluster-robust (country clusters) Huber/White standard errors in parentheses and period dummies (LIS 
survey waves). Unemployment rates and unemployment insurance (UI) generosity values are averages 
between two income survey observations; change in unemployment/generosity measured as first differ-
ence of average unemployment/generosity rates. UI generosity measured using the Scruggs (2014) 
index of unemployment insurance generosity. Number of observations by time period (Models 1-3): 
N=30 (1990-95), N=60 (1996-2007) and N=37 (2008-13). 
Our results clearly confirm that redistribution rises with unemploy-
ment. The interesting question is whether the responsiveness of re-
distribution to changes in unemployment has changed over time. 
Before looking at the results of interacting changes in unemployment 
with period dummies, it should be noted that unemployment insur-
ance generosity has, unsurprisingly, a strong positive effect on 
changes in redistribution. The coefficient for our concentration 
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measure has the predicted (negative) sign, but fails to clear conven-
tional thresholds of statistical significance in the models based on 
LIS data for the entire period 1990-2013. However, the concentration 
variable clears the 95% significance threshold in the model estimated 
with SILC data for 2004-13. 
Models 2 and 5 both suggest that the effect of changes in unemploy-
ment was bigger in the first half of the 1990s than in 2008-13 or, in 
other words, that redistribution was more responsive to rising unem-
ployment in the former period.
17
 Taken together, the results present-
ed in Tables 3 and 6 indicate that the effect of rising unemployment 
on pre-fisc inequality remains the same, but its effect on redistribu-
tion has diminished. Contrary to our expectations, it does not appear 
to be the case that changes in generosity and concentration explain 
the decline in redistribution responsiveness. The decline in respon-
siveness actually becomes more pronounced when we control for 
generosity and concentration. One plausible explanation of this puz-
zle is that the association between low education and limited access 
to unemployment insurance benefits has become stronger as fixed-
term employment has expanded since the late 1990s. We interpret the 
fact that the negative effect of concentration is much stronger in the 
analysis based on SILC data for 2004-13 as tentative support for this 
conjecture. 
The growing concentration of unemployment among workers with 
low education has to do with organizational and technological 
changes that are commonly referred to with the shorthand expression 
“knowledge economy,” but the preceding discussion suggests a more 
political explanation of the decline in compensatory redistribution. 
As commonly noted (e.g., King and Rueda 2008), many European 
OECD countries deliberately undertook to deregulate temporary em-
ployment in order stimulate employment growth in the late 1990s 
                                                 
17
 In Model 2, the difference between the coefficients for 1990-95 and 2008-2013 
is almost significant at the 90% level (p=.12); in Model 5, it clears the 95% thresh-
old (p=.02). 
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and 2000s. Holding generosity constant, deregulation of temporary 
employment means that the losers in the transition to a “knowledge 
economy” no longer had the same access to unemployment benefits 
as other workers. Employment regulation might thus be seen as a 
policy domain with important implications for compensatory redis-
tribution during economic downturns. 
 
5. The politics of redistribution 
It is tempting to attribute the widespread retreat from redistribution 
over the last 15-20 years to increased pro-rich bias in the way that 
democratic politics work and, in turn, to attribute the increase in pro-
rich bias to the equally-widespread increase in top income shares 
prior to the financial crisis. As shown in Figure 2, however, there is 
no consistent cross-national association between changes in overall 
redistribution and changes in top 1% income shares over the period 
1994-2007. By contrast, we do observe a strong positive correlation 
between changes in overall redistribution and changes in the pre-fisc 
poverty rate. 
It should also be noted that the retreat from redistribution that we 
observe over the period 1994-2007 primarily involved a reduction in 
the redistributive effect of income transfers (see Weistanner and Pon-
tusson 2016). On the assumption that the rich care primarily about 
reducing their share of taxes, we would expect pro-rich bias to mani-
fest itself first and foremost as a retreat from progressive taxation. 
Redistribution through taxes actually increased in seven of our elev-
en core countries between 1994 and 2007, but it declined in all but 
two countries in the first half of the 1990s. The retreat from progres-
sive taxation appears to have preceded the rise in top income shares 
and, following Piketty and Saez (2014), might be invoked to explain 
the latter development (see also Huber, Huo and Stephens 2016).  
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Figure 2: Changes in transfer redistribution plotted against changes 
at the top and the bottom of the income distribution, ca. 1994-2007 
 
Solid line: linear prediction. Sources: see Table 2. 
Support for redistribution among middle-income citizens has evolved 
in a manner that roughly corresponds to the over-time changes in 
redistribution. Based on data from the International Social Survey 
Program (ISSP) and the European Social Survey (ESS), Table 7 re-
ports on changes in the percentage of survey respondents in the mid-
dle third of the income distribution who agreed or strongly agreed 
with the statement that “the government should take measure to re-
duce differences in income levels.”  As the country coverage is une-
ven and the volatility of the ISSP data for the 1990s rather suspi-
cious, this table must be read with caution. For our purposes, it is the 
direction rather than the magnitude of change that matters. In every 
country for which ISSP data are available, middle-income support 
for redistribution increased in the first half of the 1990s and dropped 
in the second half of the 1990s and early 2000s. According to the 
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ESS data, middle-income support for redistribution fell from 2002 to 
2008 in all countries but Germany. In the wake of the Great Reces-
sion, middle-income support for redistribution continued to rise in 
Germany and continued to decline in Denmark, Finland and Norway.    
In the UK and the Netherlands, the Great Recession appears to have 
reversed the decline in support for redistribution. 
Table 7: Percentage-point change in middle-income survey respond-
ents agreeing that government should do more to redistribute from 
rich to poor (“agree” and “strongly agree”) 
 ISSP data ESS data 
 
early 1990s 
late 1990s, 
early 2000s 2002-08 2008-12 
Nordic:     
Denmark  -17.4 (00-04) -2.6 -1.5 
Finland  -3.9 (00-04) -1.7 -1.3 
Norway +25.2 (90-96) -4.9 (96-00) -12.7 -4.0 
Sweden  -6.0 (96-02) -3.7  
Continental:     
France    -4.4 
Germany +5.9 (90-96) -32.9 (96-00) +10.2 +6.9 
Netherlands   -3.2 +2.2 
Anglo:     
Australia  +27.7 (90-96) -18.0 (96-99)   
Canada +4.0 (92-96) -11.0 (96-00)   
UK +11.5 (90-96) -12.8 (96-02) -5.7 +5.4 
USA +26.3 (90-96) -24.0 (96-02)   
Note: “Middle-income” is defined as individuals with a self-reported post-fisc household income in the 
middle third of the income distribution. Respondents above the age of 65 are included in the sample. 
Sources: ISSP calculations by Noam Lupu (Lupu and Pontusson 2011), ESS calculations by Jan Rosset 
(Rosset and Pontusson 2014). 
Why have middle-income citizens apparently become less supportive 
of redistribution? Again, our argument is that the concentration of 
unemployment and poverty risk among low-educated immigrants, 
minorities and other marginal groups has rendered middle-income 
citizens less worried about falling into poverty and less sympathetic 
with the plight of the poor. Figure 3 provides some additional evi-
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dence in support of this argument. Based on own analyses of LIS 
microdata, the top panel of this figure reports pre-fisc poverty rates 
for individuals who have not completed secondary education divided 
by poverty rates for the adult population as a whole. The bottom pan-
el in turn reports on the share of the total adult population represent-
ed by individuals who have not completed secondary education.  
Figure 3: Ratio of pre-fisc poverty rates among low-educated indi-
viduals and total population (upper panel) and percentage share of 
low-educated individuals (lower panel), 1980-2013 
 
 
Notes: Own calculations based on LIS microdata. Low education = less than secondary education 
completed (ISCED 2011 levels 0-2). Poverty line at 50% of median pre-fisc household income (across 
all education groups). Poverty rates are defined as the share of working-age household heads and part-
ners/spouses living in households with an equivalized household income below the poverty line. 
 
With the exception of the US, the population share of the low-
educated has declined dramatically in all the countries for which we 
have LIS data going back to the 1980s and, with the exception of 
Norway, this decline has been continuous. At the same time, the av-
erage poverty rate for the low-educated rose relative to the overall 
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poverty rate from 1980-94 to 1995-2007 in each one of the ten coun-
tries for which we can estimate poverty rates for both of these time 
periods. Though overall poverty rates rose in the wake of the Great 
Recession, the concentration of poverty risk among the low-educated 
became even more pronounced in all but two countries (the Nether-
lands and the US). While there can be no doubt that economic inse-
curity has increased for a large swath of “the middle class” since 
2008, the Great Recession appears to have reinforced, rather than 
reversed, the concentration of economic insecurity (see also Hei-
denreich 2015, Schwander 2016). 
Our argument is not that middle-income opinion has been the driver 
of changes in redistribution. More plausibly, governments have re-
treated from redistribution in response to fiscal pressures associated 
with globalization and European integration and, perhaps, in re-
sponse to pressure from export-oriented firms seeking to improve 
competitiveness by lowering domestic costs. Intended as comple-
mentary to such an explanation, our argument is that the concentra-
tion of unemployment and poverty risk have rendered public opinion 
more permissive and thus made “anti-poor” policy choices a more 
attractive option for governments concerned about re-election. 
 
6.  Final remarks 
The preceding discussion focuses on macroeconomic cycles and ig-
nores the question of how growth occurs or, in other words, the idea 
that there are several different post-Fordist growth models. As noted 
by Baccaro and Pontusson (2016), the British model of consumption-
led and credit-financed growth was associated with rising top-end 
inequality while the German model of export-led growth was associ-
ated with rising low-end inequality in the period from the mid-1990s 
to the global financial crisis of 2007-08. We have instead emphasized 
that top income shares rose and market-generated poverty declined in 
most OECD countries over this period. To integrate macroeconomic 
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cycles and growth models into a unified framework is a challenge 
that we intend to tackle in future work. 
Though Ireland and Southern European countries are included in the 
regression analyses reported above, our discussion has focused on 
countries that survived the Great Recession in relatively good shape. 
We lack comparable historical data for Ireland and Southern Europe, 
but we do have data on what happened to inequality and redistribu-
tion in these countries in the wake of the Great Recession, and a few 
remarks about their experience might serve as a way to summarize 
our main findings.   
From 2008 to 2013, unemployment rates increased more sharply in 
Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain than in any of the eleven 
countries on which we have focused so far. As shown in Table 8, the 
unemployment crises experienced by these countries triggered ine-
quality shocks comparable to the inequality shocks experienced by 
the Nordic countries in the first half of the 1990s. Perhaps more sur-
prisingly, increased redistribution through taxes and transfers offset 
much of the increase in market inequality. Except for Italy, the redis-
tributive response to inequality in the so-called PIIGS was much 
stronger than in most of the eleven core OECD countries discussed 
above. Critically for our purposes, the concentration of unemploy-
ment increased less in these countries than in the OECD core and in 
the three countries for which we have ESS data for 2008 and 2012 
(Ireland, Portugal and Spain) public support for redistribution in-
creased significantly (see Rosset and Pontusson 2014). In all these 
respects, the experience of the PIIGS resembles the experience of 
core OECD countries, especially the Nordic countries, in the first 
half of the 1990s. Needless to say perhaps, the difference is that in 
the case of the PIIGS compensatory redistribution involved the build-
up of unsustainable public debt and that Eurozone membership 
forced them, from 2010-11 onwards, to cut public spending on un-
employment benefits and other redistributive programs (Koehler and 
König 2015), with distributive consequences that we do not yet see 
in SILC data. 
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Table 8: The crisis experience of Ireland and Southern Europe 
  change in 
unemployment 
2008-13 
change in 
concentration 
of unemploy-
ment 2008-13 
change in pre-
fisc Gini 
coefficient 
2008-13 
change in post-
fisc Gini 
coefficient 
2008-13 
percentage of 
inequality in-
crease offset by 
taxes and trans-
fers 
      
Greece +19.7 +0.10 +5.2 +1.4 73% 
Ireland +6.7 +0.14 +3.8 +1.9 50% 
Italy +5.5 +0.06 +2.0 +1.4 30% 
Portugal +7.7 +0.05  +3.9 0.0 100% 
Spain +14.8 +0.02 +6.5 +3.2 51% 
      
average +10.9 +0.07 +4.2 +1.6 61% 
Sources: see Table 1 and Table 5. 
Two questions that emerge from the preceding discussion deserve to 
be noted in closing. The first question concerns cross-national con-
vergence. Our regression results clearly show that pre-fisc inequality 
has grown more rapidly in more equal countries and that redistribu-
tion has declined more in countries that redistribute more. Beckfield 
(2016) presents further evidence for convergence as well as an up-
ward trend in disposable income inequality among member states of 
the European Union and develops an interesting argument about the 
consequences of European integration for redistribution at the na-
tional level. In our data, however, cross-national convergence does 
not appear to be an EU-specific phenomenon. More importantly, our 
data suggest that convergence among West European countries is 
primarily a result of the Nordic countries retreating from redistribu-
tion while tax-transfer systems in Southern European have, until re-
cently, become more redistributive. The main actors in the process of 
convergence appear to be states that are not part of the inner core of 
the European Union. This suggests that we need a less EU-centered 
account of cross-national convergence than what Beckfield (2016) 
provides. 
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The most obvious reason why core OECD countries did not experi-
ence inequality shocks comparable to the shocks of the early 1990s 
in the wake of the Great Recession is that unemployment rose less 
sharply than in the wake of the international recession of 1990-91. 
Our discussion thus invites the following question: Why didn’t the 
huge GDP contractions experienced by these countries in 2008-09 
lead to bigger increases in unemployment?  For the time being, a 
couple of observations pertaining to this question must suffice. To 
begin with, it should be noted that economic downturns in the early 
1990s were staggered and, in many countries, more prolonged than 
the Great Recession.  By historical standards, the Great Recession 
and the ensuing recovery were remarkably synchronized across 
OECD economies. Arguably, this meant that governments were more 
willing to engage in fiscal stimulus (see Raess and Pontusson 2015) 
and that, partly as a result of fiscal stimulus, the initial recovery was 
swifter, preempting increases in unemployment (which always lag 
behind GDP contractions). In addition, it may well be the case that 
wages have become more downwardly adjustable as a result of union 
decline, the expansion of fixed-term employment contracts and other 
forms of labor-market deregulation. 
Top income shares fell in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-08, 
but there are good reasons to suppose that they have subsequently 
rebounded. We know that this happened in the US in 2010-14.
18
 In a 
context characterized by income stagnation and rising economic in-
security for the working class and the lower-middle class, we might 
expect rising top income shares to become more politically contested 
than they were prior to the financial crisis. However, economic inse-
curity is today more unequally distributed than it has been for many 
decades and this poses an obstacle to the formation of a pro-
redistribution coalition of the poor and the middle. The new “right-
wing populism” can perhaps be seen, in part, as a project that prom-
                                                 
18
 According to the World Wealth and Income Database, the US top 1% share fell 
from an all-time high of 18.3% in 2007 to 16.7% in 2009, but surpassed the 2007 
figure in 2012, and stood at 17.9% in 2014. 
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ises to redistribute resources from the rich to the working class and 
the lower-middle class through protectionist measures, while keeping 
income support for the poor to a minimum. It is hardly a coincidence 
that populism primarily takes right-wing forms in core OECD coun-
tries whiles it primarily takes left-wing forms in Southern Europe. 
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